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1Abstract
We examine the implications, for social choice, of individuals having an intrinsic
sense of fairness. Taking the viewpoint that social justice reﬂects the moral attitudes of
the constituent members, we analyze the eﬀect of the intensity of the individual sense
of fairness on the solution of Nash bargaining over random allocation procedures. We
use a stylized model of university admission policies to illustrate our approach. We
show that even if social policies are ultimately determined by the bargaining power of
the diﬀerent groups, a society whose members have a common notion of fairness tends
to implement fairer admission policies when the intensity of the sense of fairness of
individual members increases.
1 A Positive Approach to Normative Economics
Social policies and institutions are shaped by the power of the constituent members to
inﬂuence these policies and institutions. A well recognized source of power is the conviction
of individuals that the policies they support are just. In general, diﬀerent individuals may
hold distinct ideas of fairness with varying degrees of conviction. Hence the design of policies
and institutions ultimately depends on the degree to which the idea of fairness is shared by
the individual members, on the intensity of their moral conviction, and on the mechanism
by which individual preferences are translated into social decisions.
In this paper we investigate the implications of individual concern for fairness in shaping
social policies. We assume that such policies are the outcome of bargaining among social
groups with diverse interests that may or may not subscribe to a common notion of fairness.
Consequently, policies are shaped by the relative bargaining power of the diﬀerent groups
which depends, among other things, on the intensity of their moral conviction. In other
words, to the extent that these policies are compatible with some notion of fairness, it
is because the individual members of the groups that subscribe to this notion of fairness
2have regard for and are willing to act upon it. To give the analysis a concrete context
and interpretation we use, by way of illustration, stylized admission policies at selective
colleges and universities. However, we do not regard this work as a contribution towards
understanding the actual formulation of admission policies. In fact, we do not presume
that the Nash bargaining model [15] is the best framework for the analysis of admission
policies. Rather we use the speciﬁc context to illustrate the ways by which individuals
sense of fairness manifest itself in the context of the Nash bargaining model to shape social
policies. While the context is speciﬁc, the approach taken here is general and may be applied,
with appropriate modiﬁcations, to the analysis of other social policies and institutions using
the Nash bargaining solution or, for that matter, other procedures that map individual
preferences into social policies, that seem appropriate.
Our analysis highlights several aspects of the issue: the eﬀect on policies of the ideas
of fairness and the degree to which they are shared among individuals belonging to the
same society, the intensity with which these ideas are held by various individuals, and the
interaction between individual preferences incorporating a sense of fairness and the social
decision making process. We assume that people possess an intrinsic sense of fairness.1
This means that acting consistently with one’s notion of what is right is a self-rewarding
activity. Put diﬀerently, a sense of fairness is a moral sentiment, that is, an emotion and
acting virtuously produces a gratifying feeling.2 In Karni and Safra [10] we developed an
axiomatic model of individual behavior incorporating this idea. In that work we considered
individual choice among procedures that rely on the outcome of lots to allocate an indivisible
good among diﬀerent claimants. We show below that policies whose implication for speciﬁc
individuals depend on their position in the population distribution of some characteristics
may be modeled using a similar analytical framework.
1This idea has a long history that goes back to St. Anselm (see discussion and references in Jasso, [7]).
Karni and Safra [10] provides additional arguments and further references.
2See Hume [6].
3Even if there is agreement on the ranking of alternative policies by their fairness, indi-
viduals may still diﬀer according to how strongly they feel about the issue of fairness. The
analysis of the impact of such diﬀerences on social policies requires quantifying the intensity
of the sense of fairness. In Karni and Safra [11] we developed measures of the intensity of
individual sense of fairness. Here we illustrate the usefulness of these measures by applying
them to the analysis of procedures intended to allocate an indivisible good among diﬀerent
claimants and to a stylized procedure of college admission.
There are many procedures by which social policies may be decided; ceteris paribus the
outcome may depend on the particular procedure employed. We consider here a class of
procedures characterized by the sole requirement that for a policy to be adopted it must be
agreed upon by all interested parties. We model this agreement as the outcome of bargain-
ing among diﬀerent social groups with conﬂicting interests. Formally, we adopt the Nash
bargaining model as our analytical framework and the Nash bargaining solution as our main
analytical tool. According to this approach, a change of policy is justiﬁed if percentage-wise
the utility gain from the change to one of the parties is larger than the percentage-wise utility
loss to the others. A policy is chosen if no change is justiﬁed.3 We show that in bilateral
bargaining situations, other things being equal, an increase in the intensity of the sense of
fairness of members of any group has the eﬀect of making the Nash bargaining solution fairer
according to the notion of fairness held by that group. Therefore, the eﬀect of a more intense
sense of fairness of members of any group on the well-being of members of the other group
depends on its initial position. Judging by the notion of fairness of the members whose sense
of fairness intensiﬁed, a group that was deprived of its fair share beneﬁts and a group that
enjoyed unfair privileges suﬀers.
The situation is more complicated in the case of a multilateral bargaining. When the
intensity of the sense of fairness of members of a given group tends to inﬁnity, the Nash
3For a discussion of bargaining as a social choice process, see Young [17].
4bargaining solution tends to the most fair outcome according to the notion of fairness held
by that group. However, this tendency is not always monotonic. There are situations in
which, locally, an increase in the intensity of the sense of fairness of a given group makes
the Nash bargaining solution less fair according to the notion of fairness held by members
of that group. We present an example that demonstrates the feasibility of such situations.
In the next section we describe the analytical framework and the method by which college
and university admission policies are embedded in this framework. A version of the Nash
bargaining model applicable to our framework is developed in Section 3. In that section we
also present our main results on the comparative statics eﬀects of an increase in the intensity
of the sense of fairness. Section 4 contains a discussion of the results and points out some of
their implications and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Individual preferences and the intrinsic sense of fairness
The study of social choice when individuals possess an intrinsic sense of fairness was ﬁrst
undertaken in Karni [9]. There the context was the need to allocate, by lot, an indivisible
good (or bad) between two claimants. The approach involved choosing a particular lot (a
random allocation procedure) by which to determine who gets the good. Individuals are
assumed to have preferences over random allocation procedures, reﬂecting their self-interest
as well as an inherent concern for the fair treatment of others. Building upon this idea Karni
and Safra [10] developed an axiomatic model of self-interest seeking moral individuals which
is applied here to the analysis of social choice.
Let N = {1,...,n},2 < n < ∞, be a set of individuals constituting a society that must
choose a procedure by which to allocate, among its members, one unit of an indivisible
good. Because the ex post allocations are necessarily unfair, the problem is to select a
5random allocation procedure that permits fairer ex ante treatment of the eligible individu-
als. Formally, let ei, be the unit vector in Rn representing the ex post allocation in which
individual i is assigned the good and denote by X the set of all ex post allocations (i.e.,
X = {ei | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}). Let P be the n − 1 dimensional simplex representing the set of all
probability distributions on X. In the present context elements of P have the interpretation
of random allocation procedures.
Individuals are characterized by two distinct binary relations on P: A preference relation
<i, representing individual i’s actual choice behavior and the fairness relation <i
F, repre-
senting individual i’s moral value judgment. The relation <i has the usual interpretation,
namely, for any pair of allocation procedures q and q0 in P, q <i q0 means that, if he were
to choose between q and q0, individual i would choose q or would be indiﬀerent between the
two. The relation <i
F has the interpretation of ‘being fairer than’ and q <i
F q0 means that,
according to individual i’s moral value judgment, the allocation procedure q is at least as fair
as the allocation procedure q0. It is assumed that the sense of fairness is a moral sentiment
that, jointly with concern for self-interest, governs the individual’s choice behavior among
random allocation procedures.
In Karni and Safra [10], we used the juxtaposition of the preference relation and the
fairness relation to derive a new binary relation <i
S on P representing the self-interest motive
implicit in the individual choice behavior. Broadly speaking, an allocation procedure q is
preferred over another allocation procedure q0 from a self-interest point of view if the two
allocation procedures are equally fair and q is preferred over q0. We also show necessary
and suﬃcient conditions under which the self-interest motive is represented by an aﬃne
function κi : P → R (with a slight abuse of notations, we also use κi to denote the gradient
of the aﬃne function), the moral value judgment is represented by a strictly quasi-concave
function σi : P → R, and the preference relation <i is represented by a utility function
V i : κi (P) × σi (P) → R. Thus, for all q,q0 ∈ P, q <i q0 if and only if V i ((κi · q,σi (q)) ≥
V i ((κi · q0,σi (q0)). In addition, we characterize the case in which function V i is additively














where hi is a monotonic increasing function. This representation is unique up to positive
cardinal unit-comparable transformation, namely, if

˜ hi, ˜ κi, ˜ σi

represent <i and is additively
separable then hi ◦ κi = c˜ hi ◦ ˜ κi + aκ and σi = c˜ σi + aσ, c > 0.
We deﬁne pure self-interest as the case in which κi = ei (that is, each individual self-
interest component depends solely on his own probability qi of winning the good). We assume
throughout that all individual preferences display pure self-interest.
In Karni and Safra [11] we developed measures that make it possible to compare the
intensity of the sense of fairness of diﬀerent individuals. In other words, we deﬁned and
characterized (on the set of all possible individuals) the relation of ‘possessing a more intense
sense of fairness’ for the additive and nonadditive models. Such interpersonal comparisons
require that the ordinal preferences and fairness relations of the individuals being compared
be themselves comparable. Put diﬀerently, the preference-fairness relations pairs (<,<F)
and
 
ˆ <, ˆ <F

are comparable if they incorporate the same idea of fairness and induce the
same self-interest relation (that is, if <F= ˆ <F and <S= ˆ <S). For comparable preference-
fairness relations with corresponding functional representations (h,κ,σ) and






ˆ <, ˆ <F

possessing a stronger sense of fairness than (<,<F) is given in Karni
and Safra [11].4 To simplify the exposition below, we assume that the preference-fairness
relation pair
 
ˆ <, ˆ <F

displays a more intense sense of fairness than the preference-fairness
relation pair (<,<F) if ˆ h = h and ˆ σ = λσ, where λ > 1. In this formulation, λ is a measure
of the intensity of the sense of fairness. This formulation is somewhat less general than the
measure developed in Karni and Safra [11], in the sense that the ratio f0/g0 is constant and
4According to Karni and Safra [11], Theorem 3,
 
ˆ <, ˆ <F

possessing a stronger sense of fairness than
(<,<F) is equivalent to the existence of monotonic increasing functions f,g satisfying h = f ◦ ˆ h, σ = g ◦ ˆ σ
and f0(ˆ h(κ · q)) ≥ g0(ˆ σ(q)).
7equal to λ. In the context of the present work this entails no essential loss of generality. To
see this observe that the local nature of the Theorem below implies that all the arguments
involving changes in λ can be reproduced for the general case by changing this ratio pointwise,
in the same direction.
Note that if all individuals subscribe to the same moral value judgment, then this moral
value judgment may be interpreted as a criterion for decision making from behind a veil
of ignorance. In this case the fairness relation is analogous to Harsanyi’s [4] concept of
social preference relation and to his concept of preference relation of an impartial observer
(Harsanyi, [3] and [5]). Even if the moral value judgment is common to all groups, the
intensity of the sense of fairness may still vary among them. In view of this observation,
it is worth emphasizing that, unlike Harsanyi’s purely normative approach, we are taking
a positive approach to social choice. According to our approach, moral considerations are
combined with self-interests to produce outcomes representing the resolution of conﬂicting
interests.
2.2 Group preferences
In what follows we analyze bargaining in a society with a given social structure. We as-
sume that individuals belonging to the same social group have the same preference-fairness
relations over some relevant subset of the set of allocation procedures, whose interpreta-
tion depends on the particular problem at hand. Formally, let {Nj}m
j=1 be a partition
of N , where each Nj represents a distinct social group consisting of nj individuals. Let
Ψ = {q ∈ P|i,k ∈ Nj ⇒ qi = qk} be the set of social procedures that do not distinguish
among individuals belonging to the same group. We assume that members of the same group
have the same preferences on Ψ. In other words, for all j = 1,...,m and for all i,k ∈ Nj,
<i = <k and <i
F = <k
F on Ψ. As in this case qi = qk, the pure self-interest components of
individuals belonging to the same group, restricted to Ψ, are the same. Note that the as-
8sumption that individuals belonging to the same social group have identical fairness relation
and identical preference relation means that they are comparable in the sense of Karni and
Safra [11]). It is possible, therefore, to perform a comparative statics analysis of the eﬀect
of increasing sense of fairness of members of the same social group using the measures of
intensity of the sense of fairness developed by Karni and Safra.
We identify Ψ with the m−1 dimensional simplex ∆ by using the isomorphism δ : Ψ → ∆
satisfying p = δ(q) if, for j ∈ {1,...,m}, pj =
P
k∈Nj qk = njqi for some i ∈ Nj. Clearly,
q = δ−1(p) if qi =
pj
nj, for i ∈ Nj. Taking into account the assumptions made in the preceding

















where i ∈ Nj and λi is the parameter representing the intensity of the sense of fairness. By
construction, Ui = Uk (and λi = λk) whenever i,k ∈ Nj. Henceforth we use the index j to
denote the various components of the utility functions of individuals belonging to group Nj.
For convenience we assume, henceforth, that σj is non-positive and that its maximal
value in ∆ is zero. Moreover, since subsequently we invoke the Nash bargaining solution, we
assume that for each j both hj and σj are concave functions. This assumption plays, in our
model, a role analogous to that of risk-aversion in the original Nash bargaining model. We
assume further that the functions hj and σj are diﬀerentiable.
2.3 Example: College admission policies
Let N = {1,...,n} be a society consisting of a ﬁnite and large number of individuals where,
as above, nj denotes the number of individuals belonging to the social group Nj. Consider
an institution, for instance a college, that has a limited number b (b < n) of openings for
new students. Assume that there exists a test whose score is positively correlated with the
students’ college performance. Each social group is characterized by a distribution function
Fj over [0,1], the range of the possible test scores. Suppose that, for reasons to be discussed
9below, the distributions of distinct groups are diﬀerent. A feasible admission policy is an
m-tuple s = (s1,...,sm) ∈ [0,1]
m, where sj is the cutoﬀ score for admission of members of
group Nj, that satisﬁes the feasibility constraint
Pm
j=1 nj (1 − Fj(sj)) = b.5 The set of all
feasible admission policies is denoted by S (b). Admission policies must be decided upon
ex-ante, namely, before individuals have a chance to observe their test scores and when they
are indistinguishable from other members of their group.
Next, using the preceding construction, we deﬁne the subset Ψ ⊂ P of personal prob-
abilities. With each s we associate a vector of probabilities q(s) ∈ Rn: for i ∈ Nj, let
πi (s) = (1 − Fj(sj)) and deﬁne qi (s) = πi (s)/
P
k∈N πk (s). The probability qi is inter-
preted as the (ex ante) probability that individual i of group Nj be included in a random
draw (of one person) from the student population. Note that the denominator is equal to b.
Ψ is the set of all these vectors. In this way S (b) is embedded in P and, as in the general
analysis of subsection 2.2, is then identiﬁed with the set ∆ using the transformation δ. The
utilities Uj are deﬁned as in equation (2).6
Aﬃrmative action policies are intended to achieve greater parity of opportunities. If
the disparity in the performance of members of diﬀerent social groups, and hence their op-
portunities, is the result of discrimination, aﬃrmative action policies that apply diﬀerent
performance thresholds for college admission to diﬀerent social groups are perceived as just.
Redressing past injustice, however, is not the sole moral imperative that may ﬁgure in the
design of college admission policy. The merit system, which imposes a uniform (nondis-
criminatory) admission standard based on performance, amounts to equal treatment of all
candidates. The merit system represents a competing moral value judgment that may be
5We assume that n is suﬃciently large to ensure that the probabilities are close to the empirical distribu-
tion. We only consider equality since preferences are later assumed to increase with admission probabilities.
6The transformation from S (b) to ∆ is one-to-one and onto. This implies that no information is lost by
the transformation. Hence any preference relation on S (b) can be represented by a corresponding preference
relation on ∆, the set of agreements in the bargaining problem to be discussed in section 3 below.
10applied to the design of college admission policy. Formally, the merit policy sm is an admis-
sion policy satisfying sm
k = sm
j = r, for all k,j. If college performance is positively correlated
with the social value-added of higher education then sm is socially eﬃcient. The merit policy
induces the admission probability vector pm = δ(q(sm)). Similarly, the proportional repre-







n, for all j, with the induced
admission probability vector ppr = δ(q(spr)). A fairness relation may take into considera-
tion both the eﬃciency and the equality of opportunity. In particular, if the diﬀerences in
the test scores among the groups is a manifestation of unequal opportunities then the moral
value judgments may involve, in addition to consideration of eﬃciency, the need to redress
past injustice. For instance, moral value judgment involving trade oﬀ between these two
components may be represented by σ that assumes the following functional form:
σ (q) = `(d(q,q(s
m))) + `(d(q,q(s
pr)))
where d is the Euclidean metric and ` is a monotonic decreasing and concave real-valued
function. Note, however, that our approach is general and can accommodate other concepts
of fairness pertaining to college admission policies.
3 Social Choice as a Nash Bargaining Solution
3.1 The bargaining model
The analysis that follows is based on the premise that social policy is ultimately the out-
come of bargaining among the groups involved. To model the situation we apply the Nash
bargaining solution adopted to the analytical framework of the preceding section. The Nash
bargaining solution is based on the assumption that the utilities of the bargainers are unique
up to positive linear transformation. This is justiﬁed if the bargainers preference relations
over the set of lotteries on the agreed upon payoﬀs are linear in the probabilities. In our
11framework, the agreements themselves, for instance, the admission policies, are identiﬁed
with lotteries on random allocations procedures of the available slots. However, the utility
assigned to the random allocation procedures is not linear in the probabilities that ﬁgure in
the design of these procedures. In particular, it is reasonable to suppose that representation
of the fairness relation is quasi-concave in the probabilities. Thus, while we do not assume
that the utility function representing the individual attitudes toward random allocation pro-
cedures are linear in the probabilities of these procedures, we nevertheless assume that the
utility functions are unique up to positive linear transformations. We justify this assumption
by adopting the approach to bargaining due to Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson [16] which,
as we explain next, is natural for the problem at hand. We note in passing, that while other
approaches to bargaining solutions may be used to model the resolution of social conﬂict and
the Nash bargaining solution has an appealing normative feature, namely, with appropriate
natural scale factors, it is the unique solution implementing, simultaneously, the egalitarian
and utilitarian solutions (see discussion in Myerson [14] 8.3).
Let ∆ be the set of all possible agreements and denote by d the disagreement point.
Extend the domain of Uj to ∆ ∪ {d}.7 Anticipating the analysis that follows, the interpre-
tation of the disagreement point requires some care. We are concerned with situations in
which a more intense sense of fairness would lead social groups to reject agreements that
they deem to be unfair even at the cost of disagreement. In the limit, when the sense of
fairness is inﬁnitely strong, all but the fairest policy are rejected. Note that in this case,
if there is no consensus regarding what constitutes the fairest policy, the solution will be
disagreement. In view of this consideration the interpretation of the disagreement depends
on the speciﬁcs of the problem at hand, which may include the institutional and legal en-
vironment. For example, if the bargaining is over the procedure of allocating an indivisible
good, a disagreement may mean that nobody gets the good. The analogous result in the
7Note that the concavity of hj ◦ δ−1 and σj ◦ δ−1 on ∆ follows from the concavity of hj and σj on Ψ.
12example of college admission policies is that if no agreement is reached the college will suﬀer
a cut-oﬀ of funding forcing it to close. In this case, the probability of admission of all groups
is zero and the disagreement point is the origin of Rm. We assume that, given the absence of
resources, this corresponds to the fairest treatment of the diﬀerent groups. We discuss the
more general case in Section 4.2. As commonly assumed in bargaining models, we suppose
that for every j there exists some random allocation procedure in ∆ that is indiﬀerent to the
disagreement point and that there exist some random allocation procedures that are strictly
preferred over the disagreement point by all groups.
A breakdown risk is a pair (p;α) ∈ ∆×[0,1] := B, where α denotes the probability that
the bargaining process will end with an agreement p; otherwise, with a probability (1 − α)
it will end with disagreement. We extend the choice set to include breakdown risks and
suppose that each player’s preference relation, <j, is extended to the set B by the following
homogeneity axiom of Rubinstein, Safra, and Thomson [16].
Homogeneity: For all α,α0,γ ∈ [0,1] and p,q ∈∆, if (p;α) <j (q;α0) then (p;γα) <j
(q;γα0).
Consequently, the utility function Uj in equation (2) can be extended to B by:
U
j (p;α) = αU
j (p) + (1 − α)U
j (d) (3)
Uj (p) is as in (2) and Uj (d) is arbitrarily chosen.
Of particular interest is the case in which d is as fair as the fairest random allocation
procedure, according to group Nj’s fairness relation. Hence, by assumption, σj(d) = 0.
This implies that the utility of the disagreement point is independent of λj, the parameter
representing the intensity of the sense of fairness. Invoking the assumption that σj ≤ 0,
the set of individually rational agreements shrinks (towards the most fair point of group j)





+ λjσj (δ−1(p)) − Uj (d) ≥ 0} ⊂





+ ¯ λjσj (δ−1(p)) − Uj (d) ≥ 0}).
13The idea that a stronger sense of fairness makes the disagreement point relatively more
attractive is reminiscent of certain explanations of the results of experiments with ultimatum
games. In these games, a ﬁxed amount of money has to be divided between two players.
One player proposes a division, which the second player must either accept or reject. If
the proposal is accepted, the game is terminated and the money is paid out according to
the proposed division. If the proposal is rejected, the game is terminated and the two
players get nothing. In many experiments it turns out that the proposer oﬀers the responder
a substantial part of the sum to be divided, and in some experiments divisions that left
the responder with small fraction of the total amount were rejected. One explanation of
these observations is that individuals have a sense of fairness and are willing to reject what
they consider to be grossly unfair divisions, namely, enforce a disagreement, even at a cost
to themselves (see Camerer, [2]). Extension of this argument leads to the conclusion that
proposed divisions that are acceptable to some responders will be rejected by responders who
have stronger sense of fairness, suggesting that it makes the disagreement point relatively
more attractive.
Under the assumption that, for all j, hj and σj are strictly concave functions our bar-
gaining problems are ‘well behaved’, that is, the image of B in the utilities space is convex.
Thus our model conforms to a Nash bargaining structure and the (n-person) symmetric Nash
bargaining solution, N (B,d), is deﬁned by





j (p;α) − U
j (d)
nj | U
j (p;α) − U
j (d) ≥ 0, j = 1,...,m} (4)
Our assumptions imply that the solution is unique. Clearly, it is attained for α = 1. Notice
that we model a bargaining problem involving n individuals. While in equation (4) the
exponent nj may suggest that individuals belonging to larger social groups possess greater
bargaining power, in fact their individual probabilities of obtaining the good may decline
with the size of the group. It is also worth noting that the symmetric treatment, implicit
in our formulation, serves to simplify the exposition and may be generalized to include
14asymmetries.
3.2 The power of moral conviction
We examine next the implications of variations in the intensity of the sense of fairness
on social policies. A concern for fairness changes the parameters of the acceptance set of
possible agreements and the solution of the bargaining problem. Moreover, the implications
of a heightened sense of fairness for the choice of random allocation policies depend on the
nature of the social decision-making procedure.
Because all known bargaining solutions pick Pareto optimal outcomes (e.g., the Nash and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky [8] solutions), when the intensity of the sense of fairness of members
of a given group tends to inﬁnity the solution tends to the fairest outcome according to the
notion of fairness held by that group. This is an immediate implication of the shrinkage of the
set of individually rational outcomes towards the fairest outcome of that group. However,
this tendency of the Nash bargaining solution to shift towards the fairest outcome is not
everywhere monotonic. There exist situations in which, locally, such an increase in the
intensity of the sense of fairness makes the Nash bargaining solution less fair according to
the notion of fairness held by members of that group.
To understand these eﬀects, it is best to start by considering bargaining between two
social groups, where the inﬂuences are most transparent. In Section 3.2.1 we show that, in
this case, an increase in the sense of fairness of all individuals belonging to a given group
always increases the degree of fairness of the Nash solution according to the notion of fairness
held by members of this group. In Section 3.2.2 we discuss the case of bargaining among
more than two groups. We present there an example which demonstrates that, locally, an
increase in the sense of fairness of all individuals belonging to a given group decreases the
degree of fairness of the Nash solution according to the notion of fairness held by members
of this group.
153.2.1 The bilateral case
In this case there are two social groups, consisting of n1 and n2 members, respectively, and
the set ∆ is therefore one-dimensional simplex. To simplify the exposition we denote points





for short. Note that this change of notation
means that h1 increases with p while h2 decreases with p.8 Using the remaining degree of
freedom in the utility representation, we normalize the utility functions so that Uj (d) = 0,


































































Following Aumann and Kurz [1] we deﬁne the boldness functions bj : ∆ × R+ → R, j = 1,2
such that b1 is the left-hand side, and b2 is the right-hand side, of equation (6). The numerator
of a boldness function is the marginal gain to group j from pushing for a more favorable
solution and the denominator is the potential loss of such a push since it may result in
disagreement. By concavity, b1 decreases and b2 increases with respect to p.
Consider next the implications of an increase in the intensity of the sense of fairness of
all individuals belonging to one of the social groups.
Theorem If σj(d) = 0 then an increase in the intensity of the sense of fairness of members
of group j implies that the policy corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution is fairer
according to the notion of fairness held by members of this group.
8More generally, elements of ∆ may be normalized such that pm = 1−Σ
m−1
i=1 pi and all derivatives are taken
with respect to the ﬁrst m − 1 variables. Under this normalization, the functions σi and hi ◦ κi are deﬁned
over the projection of ∆ over Rm−1. For an elaborate discussion of issues involve in deﬁning ‘probability
derivatives’ see Machina [13]. Note, however, that we choose a diﬀerent approach for the multivariate case.
16The case in which σj(d) 6= 0 is discussed in section 4.2 below. Note that under the
Theorem’s hypothesis, if the two groups have a common notion of fairness, then an increase
in the intensity of the sense of fairness of either or both groups results in a fairer policy.
Proof. We show that an increase in the intensity of the sense of fairness of members of
group 1 increases the fairness of the policy under the Nash bargaining solution.
























































R 0 ⇐⇒ p Q p
F (8)
where pF is the fairest point according to group 1.
Consider p < pF. By the concavity of σ1, d
dpσ1 (δ−1(p)) > 0. This, together with



















If p > pF then d
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+ ¯ λ1 (p)σ1 (δ−1(p)) = 0. The concavity of the utility
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An increase in the intensity of the sense of fairness of members of group 1, amounts to an
increase in λ1. By equation (8), this rotates the graph of the boldness function of members
of group 1 around pF (this is the situation depicted in Figure 1).
Let pN be the initial Nash bargaining solution. If members of group 1 are treated favor-
ably relative to their fairest procedure (that is, pF < pN), then the new Nash solution is at
a smaller value of p, hence closer to pF (see Figure 1).
If the initial Nash bargaining solution pN is a policy in which members of group 1 are
treated unfavorably relative to the fairest procedure (that is, pF > pN), then the new Nash
solution is at a larger value of p, hence closer to pF.
3.2.2 The multilateral case
Unlike in the bilateral bargaining case, in the multilateral case it is not true that an increase
in the intensity of the sense of fairness of members of any group always implies that the
policy under the Nash bargaining solution is fairer according to the notion of fairness held
by members of that group. In the example below we examine the eﬀect of an increase in
the sense of fairness of one group when initially none of the groups displays any concern for
fairness. As above, utility functions are normalized so that Uj (d) = 0, for all j.
Example: greater intensity of the sense of fairness causing a decrease in fairness of the
policy.

























































Figure 1: An increase of λ
1 to λ
1
∗  rotates the graph 
of b
1 around p
F and shifts the solution from p
N to p
N


































pj = 0 (12)
The comparative statics eﬀects of an increase in λ1 at λj = 0, j = 1,2,3 are obtained from
the solution of the following system of equations:

    


W1 0 0 −1
0 W2 0 −1
0 0 W3 −1
−1 −1 −1 0




































































































































































































































































and f is a monotonic increasing and strictly concave function












































































































































30 and signµ2f0 (d(p))/d(p)D =
20signD = (−1)
3 < 0. Thus the sign of d
dλ1σ1 (p) is opposite to that of the expression in the



































and the level of fairness according to group 1 decreases as their intensity of the sense of
fairness increases. 
It is easy to verify, using equation (16), that d
dλ1p1 > 0. In other words, the winning prob-
ability of group 1 under the Nash bargaining solution increases when the sense of fairness of
group 1 increases.
4 Discussion
4.1 Diﬀerent notions of fairness
The idea that in order to form moral value judgments individuals must conceive them-
selves as having to choose among policies or institutions from behind a veil of ignorance
is philosophically compelling. However, its application requires that individuals be capable
of detaching themselves from their own individual circumstances, including their personal
histories and preferences, when contemplating choices among policies or institutions. This
requirement is, in general, diﬃcult if not impossible to meet. It seems reasonable to suppose
that the idea of fairness itself varies among groups, reﬂecting the group’s experience and
sensitivities. For example, it would not be surprising if, in the United States, the concept of
fairness held by African-Americans is distinct from that held by whites even if members of
both races try to set aside their immediate interests. Our model is designed to accommodate
21situations in which diﬀerent social groups entertain distinct notions of fairness. To grasp
this, consider again the bilateral case and suppose that group 1 adheres to the concept of
fairness embodied in the merit system and group 2 regards the proximity to proportional rep-
resentation as the appropriated measure of fairness. Formally, let σ1 (q) = `(d(q,q(sm)))
and σ2 (q) = `(d(q,q(spr))) where `(·) is a non-positive, concave function and `(0) = 0.
Following the analysis of the preceding section it is clear that an increase in the sense of
fairness of members of any group results in a shift in the Nash bargaining solution closer
to what the group regards as the fairest policy. Obviously, the eﬀect of an increase in the
intensity of the sense of fairness of all groups is ambiguous.
4.2 On the signiﬁcance of the disagreement point
Thus far we assumed that the disagreement point corresponds to the fairest treatment of the
diﬀerent groups. If the disagreement point does not correspond to the fairest point and is not
Pareto optimal then σj (d) < 0 for some group j. In this case, d
dλjUj (d) 6= 0 and the values
of the functions at d must be taken into account. To grasp the signiﬁcance of this change,
consider the bilateral bargaining case. Let (d1,1 − d1) be the point in {(p,(1−p)) | p ∈ [0,1]}























+ λ1 [σ1 (δ−1(p)) − σ1 (δ−1(d1))]
(24)





= 0. The boldness function of the other group,
b2, is similarly deﬁned. As before, our assumptions imply that b1 decreases and b2 increases,
with respect to p.


























+ λ1 [σ1 (δ−1(p)) − σ1 (δ−1(d1))]
o2 (25)
This derivative is negative for p ≥ pF and is positive for the point ¯ p1 < pF satisfying
σ1 (δ−1 (¯ p1)) − σ1 (δ−1 (d1)) = 0. In other words, as it becomes more intensely concerned
about fairness, group 1 becomes less bold when it is assigned a probability equal or larger
that what its members perceive to be the fairest solution. At pF this is due to the fact that
the disagreement point is less fair than pF coupled with the fact that, as they become more
concerned about fairness, the members of group 1 become more reluctant to take a chance of
a breakdown in the negotiation. When p > pF there are opposing forces at work. On the one
hand the fact that the solution becomes less fair means that increased concern about fairness
tends to make the group take a bolder stance in the negotiation. However, the marginal gain
from an increase in the probability p is perceived to be unfair, hence the group tend to be
less bold. When p is larger but close enough to pF the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst and
the overall stance becomes less bold.
Compared to the point ¯ p1 disagreement is not less fair. On the other hand, a marginal
increase in p elevates the level of fairness. Not surprisingly, therefore, a greater concern for
fairness makes members of group 1 more inclined to risk a breakdown in the negotiation to
attain a solution that is at the same time fairer and preferred from their selﬁsh point of view.
They take a bolder stance.




at which the countervailing forces describe
above cancel each other out. At this point, deﬁned by db1 (p∗
1,λ1)/dλ1 = 0, an increased
intensity of the sense of fairness does not change the boldness of the negotiation stance
of group 1. (This is ﬁrst coordinate of the point around which the graph of the boldness
function, b1, pivots in response to changes in the intensity of the sense of fairness).
Thus far the discussion focused on the change in the boldness of group 1. However, the
23outcome of the negotiation (that is, the Nash bargaining solution) depends on the change in
the boldness of group 1 and the level of boldness of group 2. In particular, if initially group
1 received less than its fair share, that is, pN
0 < p∗
1 ≤ pF, an increase in group 1’s concern for
fairness induces it to take a bolder negotiating stance and, as a result, the solution pN
1 tends
to be fairer from the perspective of this group. However, if p∗
1 < pN
0 < pF then an increase
in the intensity of the sense of fairness of members of group 1 makes them take a less bold
position. As a result, they lose and the new bargaining solution is both less fair and less
preferred from a selﬁsh point of view (see Figure 2).
If initially group 1 received more than its fair share, that is, pN
0 > pF, an increase in
this group’s concern for fairness makes it less bold and, consequently, the new bargaining
solution pN
1 is such that pN
1 < pN
0 . In general, by becoming less bold, group 1 stands to lose
from a selﬁsh point of view, but it may gain from the point of view of fairness. If pN
0 is larger
than pF but is suﬃciently close to it, the decline in the boldness of group 1 makes it lose
on both counts. The new Nash bargaining solution is both, less fair and less preferred from
group 1 selﬁsh point of view.
To summarize this discussion we note that there exists ε > 0 such that if pN
0 , the Nash
bargaining solution corresponding to λ1 satisﬁes pN
0 ∈ (p∗
1,pF +ε) then the Nash bargaining
solution , pN
1 , corresponding to ˆ λ1 > λ1, is smaller and less fair (see Figure 2). In this case,
an increase in group 1’s intensity of the sense of fairness, by making it less bold, leads to a
social policy that is less fair according to this group’s notion of fairness and less preferred by
this group selﬁsh interests. If pN
0 ∈ [0,p∗
1]∪[pF +ε,1] then the new Nash bargaining solution,
pN
1 tends to be closer to pF. In this case, an increase in group 1’s intensity of the sense of
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1 1 λ p b  4.3 Increases in fairness vs. increases in risk aversion.
A well known comparative statics result in bargaining theory is that, in the bilateral case,
an increase in the level of risk aversion of one of the bargainers improves the outcome from
the point of view of the second (see Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler [12]). In our model,
increasing the intensity of the sense of fairness has an eﬀect on the utility function, which
seems to be similar to that of an increasing risk aversion (that is, both increase the concavity
of the utility functions). Yet, unlike in the case of risk aversion, the eﬀect of an increase of
the intensity of sense of fairness of one of the parties on the welfare of the other is ambiguous.
The explanation for this diﬀerence between the conclusions has to do with the role of the
disagreement point. Speciﬁcally, in the case of increasing risk aversion the ranking of the
disagreement point relative to the other outcomes is unchanged whereas in our model an
increase in the intensity of the sense of fairness makes some outcomes less desirable than the
disagreement point.
5 Conclusions
Building upon Hume’s [6] idea that human actions are governed, in part, by a moral sense
and are guided by the particular pleasure and pain associated with virtue and vice, Karni
and Safra [10] developed an axiomatic model of individual choice over allocation procedures
that are ex-ante fair to diﬀerent degrees. In that model, both the notion of fairness and the
intensity of individual sense of fairness are subjective.
In this paper, we propose a social choice theory based on the premise that social policies
reﬂect the ideas of fairness held by the constituent members and their relative power. In
particular, we bring our model of individual behavior to bear upon the analysis of the fairness
of social policies that, in order to be implemented, must be agreed upon by the constituent
members holding distinct notions of fairness and conﬂicting interests. Accordingly, we model
25the resolution of social conﬂicts using the Nash bargaining solution. Thus in our model a
social conﬂict is resolved once a policy is found such that there exist no other policy and
a bargaining party that may claim that a change to that policy would yield this party a
proportional utility gain exceeding the proportional utility loss to the other parties. In this
context we conducted comparative statics analysis of the eﬀect of an increase in the sense of
fairness of one group on the fairness of the social policy. We show that the results depend on
the fairness of the outcome in case the negotiation break down and no agreement is achieved.
It is natural to think that if the intensity of the individual sense of fairness of the members
of a particular group increases, that is, if the group stands more ready to reject agreements
that its members consider to be unfair, the resulting social policy will be fairer according
to this group’s notion of fairness. We show that this is true in the limit, when the sense of
fairness is inﬁnitely strong. We also show that this conclusion is necessarily true in bilat-
eral bargaining situations, provided the disagreement point is as fair as the fairer solution.
However, in bilateral bargaining situations when disagreement results in an a policy that is
not the fairest, and in multilateral bargaining situations it may be the case that, locally, an
increase in the sense of fairness of a group results in a social policy that is less fair according
to this group idea of fairness.
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